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Summary findings
Using a multisector, multicountry, computable general  Harrison,  Rutherford,  and Tarr  find that at least one
equilibrium model, Harrison,  Rutherford,  and Tarr  partner  country loses from each of the regional trade
examine Chile's strategy of negotiating bilateral free  agreements they consider, and excluded countries as a
trade agreements with all of its significant trading  group always lose.
partners (referring to this policy as additive regionalism).  They estimate that the FTAA produces large welfare
They also evaluate the Free Trade Agreement of the  gains for the members, with the European Union being
Americas (FTAA)  and global free trade.  the big loser.
Among Chile's bilateral regional agreements, only  Gains to the world from global free trade are estimated
Chile's agreements with "Northern"  partners provide  to be at least 36 times greater than gains from the FTAA.
enough market access to offset the costs to Chile of trade  Even countries of the Americas in aggregate gain more
diversion. Because of preferential market access,  from global free trade than from the FTAA.
however, additive regionalism is likely to provide Chile
with many times as many gains as the static welfare gains
from unilateral free trade.
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the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas:
The Importance of Market Access
by Glenn W. Harrison, Thomas F. Rutherford and David G. T'arr'
1. Introduction
The analysis of regional trade arrangements is typically conducted in the framework of trade
creation versus trade diversion, under which preferential tariff reduction is welfare inferior to non-
preferential tariff reduction. Wonnacott and Wonnacott [1981] showed, however, that regional trade
arrangements could produce more gains due to improved market access to trading partners. The logical
extension of this argument is that if a country were to negotiate free trade agreements with all of its trade
partners, it would end up with zero effective tariffs on all imports, or free trade, despite the legal
existence of positive MFN tariffs. In the process it would achieve preferential access to its partners'
markets. Hence, absent transition dynamics, this strategy may produce gains which are considerably
larger than unilateral free trade.
We call the process of sequentially negotiating bilateral free trade agreements with all of your
significant trading partners "additive regionalism."  There is at least one country, Chile, that is pursuing a
clearly articulated strategy of additive regionalism.' Does additive regionalism dominate free trade for
Chile? If so, by how much?  Since the answer is an empirical matter, and Chile is following such a
strategy, we answer these questions for Chile.
The government of Chile has successfully concluded a free trade area with MERCOSUR and is
seeking a free trade agreement with NAFTA. 2 Moreover, the government of Chile is attempting to add the
* We would  like  to acknowledge  the helpful  comments  of anonymous  referees  of this  journal;  Jerry  Haar  of the North-
South  Center;  Maurice  Schiff,  Alberto  Valdes  and  L. Alan Winters  of the World  Bank;  Dominique  Hachette,  Juan  Coeymans
and other  seminar  participants  at Pontifica  Universidad  Catolica  de Chile; Eugenia  Muchnik  and Hector  Assael  of the U.N.
Economic  Commission  for  Latin  America  in Santiago;  Maria  Wagner  of the Chilean  Ministry  of Finance;  M. Marcel  of the
Chilean  Treasury;  Andrea  Butelmann,  Klaus  Schmidt-Hebbel,  Ricardo  Vicuaia  and seminar  participants  at the Central  Bank  of
Chile;  and Liselott  Kana  of the Chilean  Ministry  of Foreign  Affairs.  We  thank  Isidro  Soloaga,  Ulrich  Reincke  and Minerva
Patefia  for excellent  research,  translation  and logistical  support.  We  are grateful  to the  North-South  Center  for  research  support.
The  views  expressed  are  not necessarily  those  of the World  Bank  or any  of its Executive  Directors,  the North-South  Center,  any
agency  of the government  of Chile,  or those  acknowledged.
l Mexico,  Singapore  and, to a lesser  extent,  MERCOSUR,  may  be following  the same  strategy.
2 MERCOSUR  is a customs  union  between  Argentina,  Brazil,  Paraguay  and Uruguay. Paraguay  and Uruguay  are  too
small  to be included  as separate  countries  in the our  dataset  we employ,  so our MERCOSUR  region  excludes  them.  In a free
trade  area  partner  countries  eliminate  tariffs  and export  taxes  or subsidies  against  each  other,  but retain  separate  tariffs  against
third countries.  In a customs  union  partner  regions  adopt  a common  external  tariff. Chile  has rejected  a customs  union  with
MERCOSUR.  Although  negotiations  for Chile's  membership  of NAFTA  have  stalled,  many  commentators  believe  that Chile
-1-European Union (EU), the Rest of£South  America (RSA) and several other countries to its network of
free trade arrangements. 3 More recently, momentum is building for a Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas (FTAA), which will impact on the Chilean additive regionalism strategy.
It is well known that most results regarding the welfare effects of regional arrangements are
typically ambiguous at the theoretical level, and that many questions are quantitative rather than
qualitative. Thus, we employ an 11 region global computable general equilibriumn  (CGE) model to
quantitatively examine the network of preferential arrangements that Chile is negotiating, as well as
unilateral trade policy options in Chile. The FTAA is also relevant to Chile's regional strategy, as well as
being important in its own right, so we also provide estimates of this agreement. Although the FTAA
deserves a thorough treatment, these initial estimates should prove to be of some value in the debate over
regionalism.  Finally, we estimate the impact of Global Free Trade as a reference point.  Our model
includes the Chilean economy as well as the economies of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, the United States,
Canada, Central America, the Rest of South America, the EU, Japan and an aggregate Rest of the World.
Consequently, we are able to estimate the impact on partner and excluded countries from each of the
agreements we evaluate.
Critics of Chile's additive regionalism strategy, such as Donoso and Hachette [1996], argue that
agreements with Southern countries are unlikely to be beneficial, and that it is not worth delaying the
benefits of unilateral and multilateral tariff liberalization to pursue these agreements. They argue that only
agreements with the EU, the US or Japan offer sufficient access to be worth pursuing. Advocates for the
government's strategy, however, believe that there are gains to be achieved from the agreements with
smaller Southern countries as well. They also argue, as in Butelmann and Meller [1995], that additive
regionalism will progressively reduce trade diversion costs, lower the effective average tariff in Chile,
and provide considerably improved market access. Furthermnore,  they note that Chile can unilaterally
lower its external tariff while simultaneously pursuing additive regionalism to further reduce trade
diversion costs.
We find that the results for NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and especially for additive regionalism, all
point to the crucial importance of improved market access in preferential trading areas. Taken bilaterally,
we find that trade diversion costs do indeed dominate the welfare effects of these agreements  unless
sufficient market access is obtained in partner countries (or third country tariffs are lowered).
The results provide support to the view that North-South agreements (e.g., Chile with the US or
the EU) are likely to provide sufficient market access to be beneficial, while the results for our South-
will  eventually  become  the next  member  of NAFTA.
3As of early  2001,  Chile  had reached  preferential  trade  agreements  with  at least 15 countries.
-2-South agreement (Chile-MERCOSUR) suggest the opposite. The agreements which include a Northern
partner increase the welfare of the members of the group in aggregate; only the Chile-MERCOSUR
agreement results in net losses for the members as a group. We show, however, that Chile can
unilaterally lower its external tariff (reducing trade diversion) so that even its agreement with
MERCOSUR is beneficial. 4
We find that Chile's additive regionalism strategy of combining free trade agreements with four
regions, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, the EU and Rest of South America, produces welfare gains for 'Chile
many multiples of the value of unilateral free trade if it attains tariff- free access to all these markets.
This provides support for the theoretical insight of Wonnacott and Wonnacott [  1981  ].  However, if the
most highly protected sectors in the EU and Rest of South America are excluded from the agreements, the
gains are dramatically reduced. 5
Contrary to the Wonnacott and Wonnacott [1981] result, we estimate that at least one of Chile's
potential partners in its additive regionalism strategy will lose in all of the options we evaluate. Adding
the Rest of South America to its network of agreements would substantially improve Chile's preferential
access and welfare, but would  significantly reduce the real income of the Rest of South America, which
would suffer large trade diversion losses with very little improved market access. Theory, intuition and
experience indicate that  preferential arrangements are unlikely to be implemented if the partner countries
do not also expect to gain. Nonetheless, the gains for Chile remain substantial relative to unilateral free
trade, if it could successfully negotiate these agreements with full market access.
We estimate that the FTAA will provide substantial benefits to the member countries, between
$9.6 billion and 25.2 billion per year. With the exception of Mexico, which loses preferential access to
the US market, all member countries gain. Central America reaps enormous gains by the standards of
these models, due to a combination of preferential access and increased competition from a large region
in its domestic markets. The estimated gains to the US are between $4.7 billion and $6.5 billion.
Excluded regions are always estimated to lose from any of the preferential arrangements we
consider. The largest losses to excluded regions, among the preferential agreements we consider, derive
from the FTAA.  Estimated losses to excluded countries from the FTAA range range from -$9.1 billion to
-$12.7 billion. The EU is the region that loses the most from the FTAA, and its losses of between -$4.8
billion and -$7.3 bitlion are about equal to the estimated gains of the US.
4Chile  has enacted  legislation  that will  lower  its external  tariff  from 1  I to 6 percent  in stages,  as suggested  by our
paper.  Thus,  our estimates  could  be viewed  as an ex post  assessment  of the policy  of lowering  the external  tariff.  In fact,  the
Vice-President  of the Chilean  Central  Bank  used estimates  from  an earlier  version  of our study  in his  testimony  before  the
Chilean  Parliament  in favor  of lowering  the external  tariff.
51n  fact, the experience  of some  Mediterranean  countries  (Morocco,  Tunisia,  Turkey)  in their preferential  trade
agreements  with  the EU suggests  that  the highly  protected  agricultural  sectors  are likely  to be excluded  from such  an agreement.
-3-The gains to the world from Global Free Trade are estimated to be between $199 billion and $456
billion per year. Depending on the elasticity assumption, the gains to the world are between 36 and 400
times greater than the gains to the world from the FTAA. Moreover, even the gains to the Americas (as
an aggregate region) from Global Free Trade exceed the gains to the Americas from the FTAA, by about
33 to 40 percent. These results emphasize the continuing importance of multilateral liberalization.
Since Chile starts with a relatively efficient low uniform tariff of 11%, we estimate that it can
obtain only small additional gains from improving the efficiency of its resource allocation by further
unilateral reduction of its tariffs. 6 We show that a country like Chile that starts with a uniform tariff will
typically have the gains from joining a customs union reduced if it must adopt a non-uniform structure.
Conversely, ifjoining a customs union is a movement toward uniformity, the gains are likely to be
augmented. 7 In general, this result indicates that the relative uniforrnity of the pre-existing tariff structure
for a country, and the proposed common external tariff of any customs union, must be compared on a
case-by-case basis to ascertain if welfare gains will actually be achieved.
We find that the benefits of trade liberalization or regional trade arrangements are considerably
reduced if tariff revenue must be replaced by distorting alternative taxes. Similarly, in our optimal tariff
calculations we find that unilateral trade liberalization can proceed to lower tariff levels if efficient
replacement taxes are in place. 8
Finally, we have produced an updated estimate of the collected VAT rates by sector in Chile 9,
and show that Chile can reduce its legal VAT rates to about 50% of present levels and improve its welfare
by 0.3% of GDP if it were able to eliminate evasion and collect the VAT uniformly.'° These gains are
significant when compared to unilateral trade liberalization options.
In Section 2 we describe the model and data. In Section 3 we present and explain the policy
results for Chile. In Section 4 we examine the impact on partner and excluded countries of Chile's
agreements.  In Section 5 we examine the impact of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas and
Global Free Trade.
6 This  conclusion  ignores  dynamic  gains  from trade  liberalization,  which  could  lead  to much  larger  gains.
7 Two other  countries  with  uniform  tariffs  that may  install  a non-uniform  tariff  of a customs  union  are the Kyrgyz
Republic  and Estonia.  The  Kyrgyz  Republic  has a uniform  tariff  of 10%  and has,  in principle;  agreed  to  join in a customs  union
with  Russia,  Belarus  and Kazakstan.  The  Kyrgyz have  not implemented  the common  external  tariff,  however,  because  of fears
of the costs  of the non-uniforrnity  of the Russian  tariff,  which  is the present  common  external  tariff. See Michalopoulos  and Tarr
[1996]  for details.  Estonia  also  has a uniform  tariff  of zero  and is one of the five  transition  economies  the European  Union  has
designated  as candidate  countries  for  accession.  Estonian  authorities  have  considerable  concerns,  however,  about  the costs  of
imposing  the European  Union's  common  external  tariff,  especially  in the highly  protected  sectors.
a With  low  elasticities,  however,  there  is an adverse  terms-of-trade  effect  that mitigates  the welfare  gains  from reduced
costs  of trade  diversion.
9 See Harrison,  Rutherford  and  Tarr [1997b].
0 In addition,  we eliminate  the output  tax which  applies  primarily  to energy  and  beverages  and  tobacco.
-4-2. A Multi-Regional Trade Model
A. General Features
The quantitative model developed to evaluate the trade policy options facing Chile is multi-
regional and multi-sectoral. Table 2 lists the 11 regions included explicitly in the model, as well as the 24
sectors included in each region. The general specification of this model follows our earlier multi-regional
model of the effects of the Uruguay Round."' The most important differences are the inclusion of data for
Chile, updated tariff rates for Argentina and Brazil, and more recent data for all other regions. We adopt a
multi-region model, rather than a small open economy model, since we need to consider the possible
effects on Chile of a reduction in Chile's import tariffs on other MERCOSUR members. Crucially, we
also need to account for the "market access" effects on Chilean exports of a reduction of import tariffs by
MERCOSUR, NAFTA or other regions with which Chile agrees to a free trade agreement, either
separately or collectively.
Although the general theory of the welfare effects of preferential trading arrangements does
allow for the impact of changes in partner country tariffs on the home country's terms-of-trade,' 2 some
empirical approaches to evaluating preferential trading arrangements ignore them. 13 Our framework
allows us to explicitly evaluate the importance  to Chile of improved market access to regions such as
MERCOSUR and NAFTA, as well as losses Chile may suffer as partner countries raise export prices to
Chile.
An important feature of the Chilean economy is that its tariff rate is a uniform 11% across all
traded sectors.' 4 Table 3 provides a summary of key data that are important in the analysis. The two
columns labeled TAR_BRA% and TAR_USA% show the tariffs that Brazil and the United States apply
on imports from third countries without tariff preferences. Argentinean tariffs are virtually identical to
1  1  Harrison,  Rutherford  and Tarr [1997c].  Web  site  HTtP://THEWEB.BADM.SC.EDU/GLENN/UR_PUB.HTM  provides  access
to the model  and related  publications.
12 See  Wooton  [1986]  and  Harrison,  Rutherford  and Wooton  [19891  [1993].
13 An example  is the approach  adopted  by Bond  [1996]. He  develops  a simple  general  equilibrium  specification  of the
effects  on Chile  of these  preferential  trading  arrangements  with  an impressive  level  of detail  with  respect  to tariff  data. His
results  for Chile  joining  NAFTA,  however,  differ  significantly  from ours  since  his CGE  model  does  not incorporate  the impact
on Chile  of access  to NAFTA  markets.
14  Chile  applies  a variable  levy system  on imports  of wheat  and sugar  and,  less  importantly,  edible  oils.  Monthly  prices
over  the previous  two and one-half  years  for wheat  and 50  months  for  sugar  are examined  and the distribution  is truncated  at the
top and the bottom  by an equal  percentage  (about  15%).  The  range  of the resulting  truncated  distribution  determines  the upper
and lower  bounds.  A tariff  surcharge  or reduction  of the tariff  below  the 11%  rate is applied  if the  price in the present  month  is
below  or above  the bounds.  Since  the system  is not  based  on a domestic  support  price, its impact  varies  enormously  from  year to
year.  Valdes  [1996,  p.55]  estimates  that,  between  1985  and 1995,  the nominal  protection  rate  for sugar  has ranged  from  6 % to
98 %, and the nominal  protection  rate  for wheat  has  ranged  from  45 % to -10% (see  also  Quiroz  and Valdes  [1993]). The  price
band system  has increased  protection  for  these  products,  but in our analysis  we have  ignored  this impact,  which  biases
downward  our estimated  gains  from unilateral  trade liberalization.
-5-Brazilian." 5 In the case of the United States the tariff estimates include the tariff equivalents of the non-
tariff barriers, which are quite important in the sectors with high tariffs.  If Chile forms a free trade area
with MERCOSUR or NAFTA, Chilean exporters will not face these tariffs, but outside exporters to these
regions will. Thus, these data are crucial in assessing the value of increased access that Chile will obtain
from MERCOSUR and NAFTA, respectively.
In Table 3, we also provide details on domestic distortions in Chile. The columns labeled VAT
and TY represent estimates of the rates of collected value added tax in each industry and the tax on gross
output, respectively. These rates were estimated using procedures explained in Harrison, Rutherford and
Tarr [  1  997b; Appendix A]. The different rates of VAT across sectors arise mainly because of evasion of
the VAT. One can see from Table 3 that the two largest sectors in Chile, trade and transport service
sectors and other service sectors, have a combined 61% of value-added and are the sectors with the
lowest rate of collected VAT.
B. Formal Specification
The Model. The general specification of the model follows our earlier work on the Uruguay
Round.  We concentrate here on what we have called our "base" model, which is static and assumes
constant returns to scale (CRTS). Except for the fact that imports and exports are distinguished by many
regions, the structure of the model within any country is very close to the basic model of de Melo and
Tarr [1992]; the interested reader may consult their chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of the equations.
Briefly, production entails the use of intermediate inputs and primary factors (Labor, Capital and
Land). Primary factors are mobile across sectors within a region, but are internationally immobile. We
assume Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production functions for value added, and Leontief
production functions for intermediates and the value added composite. Output is differentiated between
domestic output and exports, but exports are not differentiated by country of destination.
Each region has a single representative consumer who maximizes utility, as well as a single
government agent. In Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [1  997b; Appendix C] we formally characterize the
demand structure and elasticities which are critical to the results. Demand is characterized by nested CES
utility functions for each agent, which allow multi-stage budgeting. Demand at the top level, for the
composite "Armington" aggregate of each of the 24 goods in Table 2, is Cobb-Douglas. Consumers first
choose how much of each Armington aggregate good to consume, like wheat, subject to aggregate
incomes and composite prices of the aggregate goods. The Armington aggregate good is in turn a CES
15 Estimates  of the tariff  rates  for Brazil  and Argentina  are explained  in detail  in Harrison,  Rutherford  and Tarr [1997b;
Appendix  B].
-6-composite of domestic production and aggregate imports. Consumers decide how much to spend on
aggregate imports and the domestic good subject to the prior decision of how much income will be spent
on this sector, and preferences for aggregate imports and domestic goods are represented by a CES utility
function. Finally, consumers decide how to allocate expenditures across imports from the 10 other
regions based on their CES utility function for imports from different regions and income allocated to
consumption on imports from the previous higher level decision.
Data  and Elasticities.  Except for tariff data and the domestic tax data, the data employed to
calibrate the model come primarily from the GTAP database documented in Gehlhar et al. [1996]. We
use the preliminary release of version 3 of this database, current as of May 1996. The 1  I-region version
of the model retains all the regions of the GTAP database that are directly relevant to our policy
simulations. The full GTAP database contains 37 sectors.' 6
We generally assume that the lower-level elasticity of substitution between imports from different
regions, 0MM,  is  30 and that the higher-level elasticity between aggregate imports and domestic
production, 
0
0M,  is  15. We refer to these values as our central elasticities. There are econometric studies,
such as those of Reinert and Roland-Hoist [i992] and Shiells and Reinert [1993], that suggest values
which are lower than these. However, the studies by Reidel [1988] and Athukorala and Reidel [1994]
argue that when the model is properly specified the demand elasticities are not statistically different from
infinity and their point estimates are close to the central elasticity values we have chosen. Moreover,
elasticities would be expected to increase overtime,  and this model presumes an adjustment of about 10
years, a rather long period in the context of these econometric estimates.
To be clear, a value of 
0
MM  =  30 means that if Chile tried to raise its prices by 1% on world
markets relative to an average of aggregate imports, Chilean imports would decline relative to aggregate
imports by 30%.  Given that there may be some economists who would prefer elasticities based on the
econometric estimates yielding lower elasticity estimates, we also perform most of our important policy
simulations with 
0MM  = 8 and a,M = 4.  We refer to these as our low elasticities. A high elasticity scenario
for a small open economy such as Chile would be a specification with still less market power for exports,
such as would occur with in the popular theoretical models of international trade where goods are
homogeneous.
The elasticity of transformation between exports and domestic production is assumed to be about
16 Our  sector  aggregation  to  24 sectors  was  undertaken  in  a manner  that  ensured  that  those  sectors  with  significant  rates
of  protection  (in  the  principal  trading  partners  of  Chile)  are  retained  as individual  sectors.  That  is,  we  aggregated  sectors  which
are  not  important  in  trade  or which  have  low  rates  of protection.  It is  known  that  aggregation  may  significantly  change  the  results
in  applied  trade  policy  analysis,  but  that  this  type  of  aggregation  results  in quite  small  aggregation  bias.
-7-4 for each sector. Elasticities of substitution between primary factors of production are taken from
Harrison, Jones, Kimball and Wigle [1993] and generally reflect econometric estimates for the United
States. These estimates are relatively low for primary goods, around unity for manufacturing goods, and
elastic for tertiary goods. We assume fixed coefficients between all intermediates and value added.
Distortions. All distortions are represented as ad valorem price-wedges. Border protection
estimates combine tariff protection and the tariff equivalence of non-tariff barriers. For Brazil and
Argentina, these data were estimated by Reincke in Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [I 997b; Appendix B].
Otherwise these data are taken from the GTAP database. The protection data are presented in Table 9.
Other distortions include factor taxes in production, value-added taxes, export subsidies, voluntary export
restraints (represented as ad valorem export tax equivalents). These are also taken from the GTAP
database, except for domestic distortion data in Chile. The latter were estimated for this exercise by
Soloaga in Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [1997b; Appendix A].  Lump-sum replacement taxes or
subsidies ensure that government revenue in each region stays constant at real benchmark levels. For
Chile, however, we capture the marginal efficiency cost of the government having to raise extra revenues
through a distortionary domestic tax system. For developing countries these costs could be quite
significant, since the revenue losses from trade reform could be sizeable.
Solution Algorithm. The model is formulated using the GAMS-MPSGE software developed by
Rutherford [1995] and solved using the PATH algorithm of Ferris and Munson [20001. Although the
model has 11 regions and 24 sectors, and is large by historical standards, it is smaller than our Uruguay
Round model. Use of demand elasticities as high as those we employ could pose numerical problems in
general, but this model solved without difficulty.
3. Policy Results for Chile
We first discuss how Chile will replace the revenue it will lose from lowering its tariffs and the
welfare implications of these options. Next we discuss the results regarding the preferential trade area
policy options. In section C we examine how Chile may use unilateral tariff reduction to optimize its
trade policy. Finally, we examine the effects of Chile's strategy of "additive regionalism."
A. The Role of the Replacement Tax
Since Chile is reducing tariffs in most of our scenarios there is a revenue loss to the government.
We impose an equi-revenue requirement in all simulations, and stipulate explicitly how the additional tax
-8-revenue will be generated. We employ either the existing VAT, a uniform VAT, or a "Lump Sum" tax.
Welfare Effects of the Replacement Tax. Collection of the existing VAT is not uniform in
Chile. According to our estimates in Table 3, it ranges from 0% up to 18% across sectors.  Hence, raising
revenue through the VAT generates distortions: when the VAT is increased, resources move into less
highly taxed sectors. This reduces any possible gains from the trade policy change. Results for welfare
using the existing VAT are presented in column 1 of Table 1.
In fact, we have estimated the "marginal cost of public funds" (MCF) of the existing VAT in
Chile to be equal to 7.6%. This implies that consumers and producers will have to be taxed 1076 pesos
for the government to receive 1000 pesos. The 76 pesos are a welfare loss to the Chilean economy.
We have also calculated the MCF of the Chilean tariff, and it equals 18.5%. Despite the fact that
the tariff is uniform across sectors, and therefore imposes no intersectoral distortion costs, the Chilean
tariff imposes a higher distortion cost than the VAT because the tariff favors domestic production over
imports.
In column 5 of Table 1 we show the results of employing a "Lump Sum" tax as the replacement
tax.  This tax avoids the distortions of a non-uniform VAT since consumer income is taxed in a fixed
amount independently of consumer choices. Hence there are no resource allocation effects from the
revenue replacement tax instrument. The results show that there is an added welfare cost of using the
VAT, as compared to the lump-sum alternative.
Finally, in column 3 of Table I we show the results of using a uniform VAT. In these scenarios
we first counterfactually create an equilibrium in which all other domestic taxes and subsidies are zero
and the VAT is uniform. The impact we evaluate is then solely due to the trade policy change alone.
Since all sectors are taxed, and there is no labor-leisure choice, there is no way to take an action that will
lower the tax. In other words, there are no resource allocation effects and the uniform VAT is essentially
equivalent to a Lump Sum or distortionless tax in our model. In addition, any "second best" interaction
effects of distortions between the tariff and the existing VAT will be removed if we start with a uniform
VAT and no other distortions (for this reason the results for the Lump Sum tax and the uniform VAT may
differ). In these scenarios we equalize the VAT across sectors and solve for the level of the VAT that is
required to compensate for the lost revenues.
Revenue Effects. In column 2 of Table 1 we present the equiproportional increase in the VAT
required to keep government revenue constant. For example, with central elasticities a free trade area
with MERCOSUR will require a 45% increase in the VAT rate across sectors. That means if the collected
-9-VAT rate is 10% in a sector (see Table 3), the collected VAT rate will have to increase to 14.5%. With
central  elasticities  there is a strong  substitution  away from imports  that pay tariffs in favor of imports
from  partner  countries  that are tariff free.  Then  the revenue  requirements  for the VAT  are quite high in
order  to compensate  for the lost tariff  revenues.  With low  trade elasticities  the revenue  requirement  for
the VAT  is much  smaller,  ranging  from an increase  between  17%  and 26% in the three basic  preferential
trade arrangement  scenarios  presented  in rows 1-3.
In columns  4 and 7 we show  tariff revenues  collected  in the new equilibrium  as a percentage  of
GDP. In our initial equilibrium tariff revenues are equal to about 3.6% of GDP, but in the preferential
trade  area scenarios  (rows 1-3)  they  fall to between  0.9% and 2.7%  of GDP.  Thus,  in the preferential
trade  area scenarios  tariff revenues  fall to between  25%  and 75%  of original  tariff revenues.  The loss of
tariff  revenue  is higher  with NAFTA  (because  NAFTA  is a larger  share of Chilean  imports  than
MERCOSUR)  and higher  with central  elasticities  because  of the greater  trade diversion.  The  VAT
revenues  as a percentage  of GDP constitute  about  9% of GDP initially.  Depending  on the preferential
trade area and elasticities,  the  tariff loss is between  0.9% and 2.7%  of GDP.  Hence,  if the VAT is
employed  as the replacement  tax it will be necessary  for VAT revenues  to increase  by about 10%  to 30%.
Some  may question  if the implied  increase  in the  VAT is too high. To provide  intuition  for the
model  implications  for the VAT,  consider  a particular  scenario  where  the lost tariff revenue  is about  2.5%
of GDP,  as in row 6 with central  elasticities.  It is estimated  in Table 1  that the  VAT rate will  have to
increase  by 45%  to a legal  rate of about  26%.  In 1994  the legal  VAT  rate of 18%  generated  VAT
revenues  of about  9% of GDP,  so the legal  rate was twice  the collected  rate.  Assuming  no change  in the
rate of VAT  evasion,  it will therefore  be necessary  to raise  the VAT  by 5%  to generate  2.5%  of GDP (i.e.,
from 18%  to 23%).
Why does  the model  predict  a required  increase  of the VAT  rate to 26%, and not 23%?  The
reason  the model  predicts  an extra  3% increase  in the legal  VAT  rate is that an increase  in the tax will
induce  a shift away  from the highly  taxed  sectors  and an erosion  of the tax base. Given  our model
parameters,  increases  in the VAT  continue  to generate  additions  in revenue  within  the range  under
consideration,  hence  we remain  on the revenue  increasing  side of the "Laffer  curve". But it is possible
that a more  realistic  representation  of the VAT  in Chile  would  incorporate  an increase  in evasion  rates
with increases  in the VAT  rate, or simply  that the rate of VAT  collection  cannot  be increased  in some
sectors.  In this case,  the required  legal VAT  rate increase  and distortion  costs of revenue  replacement
would  be still  higher  than we have  estimated,  or possibly  the VAT  is not a feasible  tax to generate
-10-considerably more revenue without further reform in collection procedures. 17 Given the uncertainties of
rates of evasion of VAT in Chile, these estimates should be taken as indicative of revenue requirements
rather than as precise recommendations for the VAT rate. In fact, we emphasize below the importance of
uniformity of collections.
B. Preferential Trade Area Options
Results in Table  1. The overall welfare results for the trade policy options are presented in Table
1. More detailed results on output, imports and exports for the main scenarios, with central elasticities,
are displayed in Table 4 (see Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [1997b] for detailed results with low
elasticities). Welfare impacts are presented as a percent of GDP of Chile. They represent changes on a
recurring, annual basis, so a 1% welfare gain should be interpreted as a 1% increase in real income each
year in the future.
In the first row of Table I we present the results from the scenario where Chile forms a free trade
area with MERCOSUR. We assume that each of the MERCOSUR  countries represented in the model,
Argentina and Brazil, reduce their tariffs, export subsidies or taxes on their trade with Chile to zero and
that Chile does the same for its trade with MERCOSUR. Chile does not adopt the common external tariff
of MERCOSUR in this scenario.
The second scenario, shown in row 2, represents Chile joining MERCOSUR as part of the
customs union.  In addition to the requirements of the scenario in row 1, in this case Chile adopts the
common external tariff of MERCOSUR. Although Chile has not joined the MERCOSUR customs union,
it is a potential policy option so we evaluate it in this scenario. For simplicity, we assume that the
common external tariff that Chile adopts is the import tariff structure that Brazil currently has with the
countries that are not in MERCOSUR. 18
The third scenario, in row 3, is Chile forming a free trade area with NAFTA. In row 4, primarily
'7 To quantify  these  ideas,  we  have  simulated  Chile's free  trade  area  with  MERCOSUR  and NAFTA  where  we assume
that the services  and trade  and transportation  sectors  cannot  have  their collected  VAT  rates  increased  due to evasion.  (These  are
the  sectors  with low  rates  of VAT  collection  and where  evasion  of the VAT  may  prevent  additional  collections;  together  they
produce  about  65%  of Chilean  value-added.)  With  central  elasticities,  the welfare  loss  in this case  from the free  trade  area  with
MERCOSUR  is increased  to -0.60%  of GDP  and the gains  from  the free  trade  area  with  NAFTA  are reduced  to 0.  12%  of GDP.
As expected,  the  required  rate of VAT  increase  jumps  to about  75%.
18 This  tariff structure  is slightly  different  than the tariff  structure  shown  for  Argentina.  There  are two reasons  for this.
First,  there are exceptions  to the common  external  tariff  for Argentina  and  Brazil,  as both  countries  continue  to adapt  their  tariff
schedules  over  time  to the agreed  common  external  tariff. In addition, Argentina  and Brazil  could  well  have adopted  exactly  the
same  common  external  tariff  at a detailed  tariff  line  level,  but  have  different  trade shares  across  these  tariff  lines. With  the
different  trade  weights,  the rates  that appear  in the GTAP  database  at the 24 sector  level  reflect  differences  in these  trade
patterns,  and need  not  reflect  differences  in  the common  external  tariff  at the detailed  tariff line  level. For ease  of comparison  we
also  assume  in our "Chile  customs  union  with  MERCOSUR"  scenario  that  Argentina  adopts  the tariff  of Brazil  as its common
external  tariff. This  provides  a clean  representation  of the MERCOSUR  customs  union  for our purposes.
-11-to help understand the results, we evaluate the consequences of a free trade agreement between Chile and
NAFTA in which Chile does not obtain improved access to the NAFTA market. After discussion of these
scenarios, we introduce further simulations to help explain the results and evaluate modified options.
The effects on welfare are dependent on both how Chile chooses to replace the lost tariff
revenues and on assumed elasticities. Chile's preferential trade policy options with MERCOSUR lead to
a loss of welfare with our preferred central trade elasticities and negligible gains or losses with low trade
elasticities. With central trade elasticities, the trade diversion costs of an agreement with MERCOSUR
typically dominate the trade creation effects. Moreover, based on the MERCOSUR external tariff,
preferential access to the markets of MERCOSUR is insufficient to overcome this welfare loss in Chile's
markets. Welfare losses are lower with lower assumed elasticities because there is less trade diversion
when Chile's consumers are less willing to substitute MERCOSUR's products for those of the rest of the
world.'9
The results indicate that the customs union with MERCOSUR is an inferior outcome for Chile
compared with a free trade agreement with MERCOSUR. Inspection of Table 3 reveals that
MERCOSUR's tariff structure is diverse compared with Chile's tariff, which is uniform. Since the
welfare costs of trade restrictions tend to increase disproportionately with the height of the tariff, Chile is
better off with its own uniforn  tariff than with the common external tariff of the customs union. 20 That is,
part of the costs to Chile ofjoining a customs union with MERCOSUR derive from the loss of tariff
uniformity.
In comparing our results in rows 1-3 regarding Chile's preferential trade area options, the most
important result is that the free trade area with NAFTA is beneficial to Chile while
the other options are likely to present problems. 2" In order to ascertain the source of the gain to Chile
from a free trade area with NAFTA, we performed the simulation in row 4 in which Chile lowers its
tariffs against imports from NAFTA countries but does not obtain improved access in NAFTA markets.
Although this is not a policy option that Chile would adopt, the results of row 4 show that Chile loses
from preferential reduction of its tariffs against NAFTA countries without reciprocal access to NAFTA
markets, since the trade diversion dominates the trade creation.
In order to identify even more precisely the source of the access gains from the FTA with
19  These results are consistent with those of Donoso and Hachette [1996] and Muchnik, Errazuriz and Dominguez
[19961.  Based on the results of Muchnik et al., which focused on agriculture, Donoso and Hachette estimated that access to the
MERCOSUR market would not offer significant gains to Chile.
20 "Ramsey optimal" tariffs will vary inversely with the elasticity of demand. Typically, however, departures from
uniformity do not conform with Ramsey optimal rules, but rather with political economy considerations (see Panagariya and
Rodrik [1993]).
21 Coeymans and Larrain [1994], Reinert and Roland-Holst [1996], and Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis and Robinson [1995]
also found that Chile will gain from a free trade area with NAFTA.
-12-NAFTA, we performed a simulation in which access to only one sector was not obtained: non-grain
crops. Our estimates of the tariff distortions in Table 4 suggest that the United States tariff is likely to be
central in this sector: there is a 20% tariff on non-grain crops. 22 In other words, Chile applies zero tariffs
against NAFTA imports, and NAFTA applies zero tariffs against imports from Chile in all sectors except
non-grain crops.  Although not shown in Table 1, if Chile fails to obtain preferential access in non-grain
crops,  the welfare gains of 0.82% we obtained in the full access case now drop to a welfare loss of -
0.58%. Thus access in non-grain crops is crucial to welfare gains from NAFTA. 23
These results demonstrate the importance of improved access emphasized by Wonnacott and
Wonnacott [1981]. Our results show that Chile can gain more from a FTA with NAFTA than it can from
global free trade; but Chile can expect to lose from any of the preferential trade agreements we have
considered if there is no improvement in access to partner country markets.
The Importance of Low Uniform Tariffs. These results differ from several earlier numerical
evaluations of preferential trading areas (e.g., see Rutherford, Rutstrom and Tarr [1993] and Harrison,
Rutherford and Tarr [1997a]). We speculate that part of the reason that trade diversion dominates trade
creation in these estimates is that Chile has a low and uniform tariff. That is, although it is not true as a
general proposition, the implementation of a preferential trade agreement in a country that starts with a
dispersed tariff structure may result in a reduction in the dispersion of the tariff structure. Potential
benefits from a reduction in the dispersion of the tariff, however, are ignored in more aggregated analyses
of preferential trade arrangements. 24 To verify this intuition we have counterfactually created an initial
22 Although  the GTAP  database  indicates  that the U.S.  tariff  on non-grain  crops  is 47%,  we  have  lowered  this to 20%
in our benchmark  equilibrium  for  two reasons.  First,  we  prefer  updated  estimates  where  possible.  The  most important  non-grain
crops  products  for Chile  are fruits  and vegetables,  and post-Uruguay  Round  tariff  rates  for these  products  in the U.S.  market  are
the relatively  modest  figures  cited  below  in this footnote;  the higher  protection  estimates  for  these  products  in the GTAP
database  (averaging  56%)  were derived  from  an average  of protection  estimates  in the 1989-1994  period.  Second,  the U.S.
protection  on these  products  varies  with  the season.  We have  assumed  that  given  production  in the opposite  hemispheres,  when
Chilean  fruits  and vegetables  are  ready for  harvest  and export  to the U.S.,  they would  typically  face  U.S.  tariffs  that are in the
low  range of the seasonal  tariffs  applied  by the United  States. Products  included  in  the non-grain  crops  category  of the GTAP
database  (along  with  the estimated  tariff  and tariff  equivalent  of the non-tariff  barrier  in the U.S.) are:  sugar,  67%;  oilseeds,
including  peanuts,  25%;  coffee,  cocoa  and tea, 0%;  cotton,  31%;  vegetables  (fresh,  0-25%;  frozen,  17.5-25%;  dried,  25-35%,
prepared  and preserved,  13.6-14.7%);  fruits  (fresh,  0-20%,  dehydrated,  0.6-2.2%;  frozen,  0.7-14%/o;  juices,  0-31.3%;  jams and
pastes,  7.0-35%;  canned,  1.9-20%);  and other  non-food  crops  (tobacco,  jute,  etc), 19%.  The  reduced  estimates  are closer  to the
estimates  of Butelmann  -and  Meller  [1995;  p. 376].  They  report  that Chilean  fresh,  frozen  and-canned  vegetables  face  MFN  tariff
rates  in the United  States  ranging  from  9.5%  to 17.5%  (with  a few  percentage  reduction  for the former  two categories  where  GSP
treatment  applies),  and  that Chilean  fruits  face  United  States  MFN  tariffs  from 1%  to 10%.
23 Since  U.S.  protection  in milk  products  is also  high, we  examined  the impact  of denial of improved  access  in NAFTA
markets  for  Chilean  products  on both  non-grain  crops  and  milk products.  Chile  exports  very little  milk  products,  however,  so the
welfare  result  was  only  slightly  more  adverse  for  Chile  (-0.60%  of GDP  with  central  elasticities  and existing  VAT  replacement)
relative  to denial  of Chilean  access  in non-grain  crops  alone.
24 There  is  value  in further  theoretical  work  into  the generality  of the impact  of preferential  arrangements  on
uniformity.  Note also  that in our model  elasticities  are equal  across  sectors,  so the Ramsey  optimal  tariff  is uniform.  A useful
exercise  would  be to evaluate  the impact  of a preferential  trade  arrangement  where  we start  from  randomly  selected  elasticities
-13-equilibrium in which Chile applies a 22% tariff on one-half of its imports and a zero tariff on all others,
and then implemented the policy scenarios in rows 1-4 of Table 1 (where we have employed existing
VAT replacement and central elasticities). The sectors with the high tariffs were selected at random and
the experiment was repeated 206 times. The means of the distributions for welfare as a percent of GDP
are as follows: free trade area with MERCOSUR, -0.56%; customs union with MERCOSUR, -0.44%;
free trade area with NAFTA, 1.47%;  and free trade area with NAFTA  but no improved access, -0.52%.
The gains the free trade area with NAFTA are significantly larger when based on the hypothetical
non-uniform initial tariff structure. Similarly, the losses from the free trade area with MERCOSUR are
slightly smaller, reflecting a movement toward uniformity. But losses from a preferential reduction of
tariffs toward the NAFTA markets remain unless access to the NAFTA market is obtained.
In this hypothetical experiment, we find that the ranking of the customs union with MERCOSUR
versus the free trade area with MERCOSUR is reversed compared with the actual situation represented
by Table 1. Although Chile still loses from both preferential trade agreements with MlERCOSLJR,  it is
intuitive that the customs union produces less losses than the free trade area because the common external
tariff of MERCOSUR is more uniform than the hypothetical Chilean tariff. In the actual situation of
Table 1, the customs union with MERCOSUR  represents a movement awayfrom  uniformity.
C. Optimizing Chile's Trade Policy Options
We know from theory that Chile can reduce the trade diversion costs of preferential trade areas if
it lowers its external tariff. Thus a number of economists 25 have recommended a reduction in Chile's
external tariff be combined with its free trade agreements. In rows 5 and 6 we evaluate the two free trade
area options with a simultaneous reduction of the tariff to 6%.  In rows 7 and 8 we evaluate the impact of
lowering the external tariff to 8% and 6% on a multilateral basis. We evaluate going to global free trade
in row 9.
We first explain why Chile may have a low] optimal tariff despite being a small country. If
Chilean exports are differentiated from the products of other countries so that Chile in aggregate faces a
downward sloping demand curve for a product (even if individual Chilean producers do not perceive a
downward sloping demand curve), then there will be an optimal export tax to maximize Chilean export
profits. The height of the optimal export tax will be inversely related to the elasticity of demand faced by
across sectors and see how often Chile gains from preferential trade agreements as we use a large number of distinct sets of
elasticities.
25 Such as Schiff [1996], Corbo [19661 and Leipziger and Winters [1996].
-14-Chile in its export markets, 26 which is in turn determined by how substitutable Chile's products are with
those of other countries. In the limit, when Chilean products are perfect substitutes in all its export
markets for products from all other countries, Chile has no ability to obtain a higher price by restricting
its exports. In this case the optimal export tax is zero.
Although Chile imposes virtually no export taxes, the Lerner symmetry theorem tells us that in
general equilibrium import tariffs are equivalent to export taxes.  The import tariff will tax all export
sectors roughly uniformly. However, with product differentiation and many sectors, market power on
exports differs across sectors and destination markets. Hence the import tariff is not as efficient an
instrument as export taxes varying by sector and destination. Nonetheless, if export taxes are ruled out,
there is a positive optimal import tariff. Given the existence of an 11 % uniform tariff, however, we
investigate both theoretically and numerically whether the optimal tariff is above or below the existing 11
% tariff.
In our central elasticity scenarios we have assumed that all countries have an elasticity of
substitution between imports from different countries (aMM)  equal to 30. We show in Harrison, Rutherford
and Tarr [ I  997b; Appendix C] that the optimal tariff t  is bounded below by t*= {  [o/(o-  1)] - 1  }. Thus,
even with cMNI  = 30 the optimal tariff is over 3%; but in our low elasticity scenarios, with a,,  = 8, the
optimal tariff is over 14%.
Considering the preferential trade options in rows 5 and 6, we see that there is the expected
increase in the estimated welfare gains compared with rows 1 and 3, respectively. With central elasticities
there is a significant improvement in welfare compared with an 11% external tariff. With low elasticities,
the adverse terms-of-trade effect of reducing tariffs mitigates the welfare gain from reducing the trade
diversion costs.  These results show that as long as Chile limits itself to a free trade area it can profit
from the increased access it obtains in its partner countries without excessive trade diversion costs,
provided it lowers its external tariff sufficiently. In particular, the results in row 5 show that the free trade
agreement with MERCOSUR can be expected to yield benefits when the external tariff is lowered to 6%.
On the other hand, comparing rows 5 and 6, we observe that an agreement with NAFTA is worth a lot
more than one with MERCOSUR, largely due to the superior market access of NAFTA.
In rows 7 and 8 we present the estimates of the welfare and replacement tax implications to Chile
of unilaterally lowering its external tariff. With central elasticities and distortionless domestic taxes
(Lump Sum or uniform VAT), unilateral reduction of the tariff to 6% increases welfare, and there are
26 Individual competitive firms will price at their marginal costs, but since the country as a whole must accept a lower
price to sell more, there is an optimal export tax that equates the marginal revenue received from exports equal to the marginal
costs. The more elastic the demand, the lower the optimal export tax.
-15-further gains from reducing tariffs from 8% to 6%. With the existing VAT as the replacement tax,
reducing the tariff to 8% increases welfare. However, the distortion costs of the VAT are sufficiently
close to the tariff, so that in combination with the small adverse terms-of-trade effects, there are no
further gains from tariff reduction below 8%. With a distortionless replacement tax, reduction of the
external tariff to zero produces positive welfare gains compared with the 11% tariff (row 9). However,
since the gains are less than reduction to 6% (row 8) the optimal tariff is between 0% and 6%.27
With existing VAT replacement there is some limited scope for beneficial reduction of the tariff
with central elasticities. Again, with higher elasticities the optimal tariff is lower and the gains from tariff
reduction would increase.
D. Sectoral Impacts
In Table 4 we present the impacts under central elasticities on output, exports and imports at the
24-sector  level from three of the principal trade policy options: the free trade area with MERCOSUR, the
free trade area with NAFTA, and unilateral reduction of the tariff to 8%.28 Focusing on the percentage
change in output with central elasticities, the sectors that significantly expand with the free trade
agreement with MERCOSUR are transportation equipment (dramatically), 29 machinery and equipment,
iron and steel, and milk. With the free trade agreement with NAFTA the sectors that expand more than
10% are iron and steel, transportation equipment, milk, non-grain crops, and textiles. With unilateral tariff
reduction the expanding sectors are transportation equipment, iron and steel, and to a lesser extent non-
ferrous metals and mining.
Iron and steel and transportation equipment expand under all three trade policy options, but the
other expanding sectors differ. Iron and steel and transportation equipment are both small sectors in
Chile; in Table 3 we note that each sector produces less than 1% each of Chilean value-added. However,
these are the two sectors that export the most intensively: both export over 90% of their output.
Preferential or multilateral tariff reduction induces a depreciation of the real exchange rate, which makes
exporting more profitable and gives a boost to the sectors which export intensively.
With unilateral tariff reduction the other sectors which expand (non-ferrous metals and mining)
are also the ones that export a high percentage of their output. So the real exchange rate impact and
27 These were the results employed by the Vice-President of the Central Bank of Chile in his presentation before the
lower house committee of the Chilean Parliament when he argued for a reduction of the tariff to 6%. In fact, we have separately
calculated the optimum tariff with central elasticities at between 3% and 4%, and with the low elasticities about 14%,  assuming
Lump Sum replacement of tariff revenues in each case.
28 See Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [1997b] for the sectoral results with low elasticities.
29 Although the expansion is dramatic in percentage terms, it is starting from a very small base. Thus the absolute
increase is plausible.
-16-export intensity explain well the pattern of expanding and contracting sectors with unilateral non-
discriminatory tariff reduction.
With a free trade agreement with NAFTA, textiles, milk and non-grain crops expand, in addition
to the two or three most export intensive sectors, because these three sectors obtain a substantial
improvement in their terms-of-trade in the US market. We considered earlier how improved access to
non-grain crops and milk is crucial to an improvement in Chilean welfare from NAFTA, and these
sectoral results are consistent with those welfare results.
With the free trade agreement with MERCOSUR, machinery and equipment and milk expand in
addition to transportation and iron and steel. Our data indicate that these two sectors are two of the most
highly protected in MERCOSUR, so these sectors obtain relatively greater improvement in their terms-
of-trade after implementation of a free trade agreement with MERCOSUR, which induces their
expansion.
E. Additive Regionalism
Butelmann and Meller [1995] have articulated the strategy of the government of Chile: to
negotiate bilateral free trade agreements with MERCOSUR, NAFTA and all of its  significant and willing
trading partners, including the EU and the Rest of South America (RSA).0 They argue that this strategy
will progressively lower the effective average tariff, successively reduce trade diversion costs and,
crucially, help to assure stability of access to the markets of partner countries. l'he free trade agreement in
late 1996 between Chile and Canada, in which both countries agreed to eschew antidumping actions
against each other, is regarded as a notable example of the advantages that the bilateral approach offers.
An opposing view within Chile is offered by Donoso and Hachette [1996], who argue that the limited
market access of the bilateral agreements with the Southem countries (e.g., MERCOSUR) is not worth
delaying the benefits of opening up unilaterally, although agreements with the large markets of the United
States, the EU or Japan would be worthwhile. Moreover, they fear that the MERCOSUR arrangement
may restrict broader liberalization.
In Table 5 we present estimates of the gains to Chile of progressively adding free trade
agreements, where we use our central elasticities and a Lump Sum tax as the replacement tax. Columns 1
and 2 are reproduced from the estimates in Table 1. Column 3 shows that although MERCOSUR
independently results in losses to Chile, when combined with an agreement with NAFTA, the impact of
an agreement with MERCOSUR is positive rather than negative. The reason is that competition from
30 The percentage share of Chile's aggregate exports (imports) for its most significant trading partners are: USA 14
(25); Brazil 5 (7); Argentina 5 (6); EU 32 (23); RSA 5 (5); and Japan 17 (10).
-17-NAFTA producers greatly reduces the extent and impact of trade diversion. 3'  Row 1, column 4 shows
that combining agreements with NAFTA and MERCOSUR with an agreement with the EU results in a
large increase in the gains to over 5% of GDP. Finally, adding a free trade agreement with the RSA
results in gains of 8.4% of GDP. These are enormous estimated gains for a constant returns to scale
model such as ours. In the last column of row 1 we exclude the US from the agreement, but this has only
a small negative impact on Chile since it obtains such substantial preferential access in the other markets.
Critics of the government's strategy argue that it is unrealistic to assume that the EU would grant
tariff free access in its highly protected agricultural products as part of a free trade agreement with Chile.
The EU has steadfastly refused to do so in its Association Agreements with the Central and Eastern
European countries and in its Free Trade and Customs Union Agreements with Mediterranean countries
such as Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. Hence it is unlikely to offer concessions to Chile that it has
refused to offer to other countries for which it might be viewed as having more to gain geo-politically.
Similarly, although more speculatively, it would be doubtful that tariff-free access in the most highly
protected products (see Table 3) would be provided by the RSA, since (following Grossman and
Helpman [1995]) the political economy interests that obtained such high protection would resist regional
competition as well.
In row 2 of Table 5 we present results which more realistically reflect possible outcomes due to
excluded products. We exclude agricultural products from the agreement with the EU, and we exclude
products with tariffs above 25% in the RSA from that agreement. The results show, as expected, that
without preferential access to these highly protected markets the gains would be dramatically reduced.
The last column shows that the US is crucial to the whole story. If the US is not included in the additive
agreements, the gains drop dramatically to 0.44% of GDP. The drop in welfare for Chile exceeds the
gains from NAFTA alone, showing that competition from (and in) the US is important to Chile being able
to avoid the trade diversion costs of these agreements. Conversely,  if Chile can get a free trade
agreement with the US as part of NAFTA, then free trade agreements with MERCOSUR, the EU and
3 "NAFTA and  MERCOSUR  combined  produce  gains  of 1.48%  of GDP,  whereas  if the results  of the  NAFTA  and
MERCOSUR  agreements  were  merely  additive  (columns  I plus  2) the  gains  would  be only  0.61  percent  of GDP.  That  is,  we
find  that  reduced  trade  diversion  from  the combined  agreements  accounts  for  0.87  percent  of GDP.  Since  this  may  appear  to be
too  large  a saving  due  to  reduced  trade  diversion,  to verify  our  explanation  we  have  three  additional  simulations:  (I) Chile
unilaterally  eliminates  tariffs  on NAFTA  imports  without  improved access  to NAFTA;  (2) Chile  unilaterally  eliminates  tariffs
on MERCOSUR  imports  without  improved  access  to MERCOSUR;  and (3)  Chile  unilaterally  eliminates  tariffs  on NAFTA  and
MERCOSUR  without  improved  access  to NAFTA  or MERCOSUR  markets.  If our explanation  is correct,  simulation  3 should
result  in  reduced  trade  diversion  costs  of at  least  0.87%  of GDP,  compared  to  additive  losses  of the  first  two  simulations.  In
percent  of GDP,  the  welfare  impacts  from  these  three  simulations  are:  (1) -0.83;  (2)  -0.82;  and  (3)  -0.77  (all  as  a percent  of
GDP).  If the losses  of  the preferential  tariff  reduction  were  additive  the  total  losses  would  be -1.65  (=  -0.83  -0.82).  Since
preferential  tariff  reduction  against  the  two  regions  combined  results  in  losses  of only  -0.77  percent  of GDP,  trade  diversion
costs  are reduced  by 0.88  percent  of GDP  by combining  tariff  reduction  to the two regions.
-18-RSA each add, impressively, about 0.5% to Chilean GDP. These gains accrue even when the EU and
RSA exclude their most highly protected items from the agreements.
Proponents of the government's strategy maintain that the trade diversion costs of the free trade
agreements will be diminished because Chile will adopt a 6% external tariff. Moreover, while they
concede that access to the EU in agricultural products is unlikely, they maintain that it is possible that
Chile will receive full access to the markets of RSA in view of the sustained trend toward open
economies in Latin America.  In row 3 of Table 5 we evaluate the  impact of a 6% external tariff with the
same products excluded from the agreements with the EU and RSA as in row 2. There are slightly larger
gains to Chile from lowering the external tariff, but the US remains quite important for substantial gains.
In rows 4 and 5 we evaluate additive regionalism where only EU agricultural products are excluded, so
that full access to RSA is obtained. Columns 5 and 6 show that Chile obtains very substantial gains, with
either a 6% or 11% external tariff, if it can obtain tariff-free access to the highly protected markets of
RSA.
Thus, if Chile succeeds in including a wide net of countries in its additive regionalism strategy,
the estimates of the welfare gains range from 0.44% to 8.4% of Chilean GDP. On the other hand, from
Table 1 we see that the gains to Chile from unilateral trade liberalization are only about 0.1  1% of GDP.
Hence, the estimated gains to Chile from additive regionalism are between 4 and 76 times the gains from
unilateral trade liberalization. On balance, it appears that Chile has little to lose by pursuing additive
regionalism, especially because additive regionalism is being combined with lowering the external tariff
to about 6% to 8%.
4. The Impact on Partner and Excluded Countries of Additive Regionalism
Experience with regional trade arrangements has shown that if the agreement is not mutually
beneficial to all parties, then it is unlikely to be effectively implemented or sustained (World Bank
[2000]).  Agreements may exist de facto, but are not implemented effectively. Thus, the impact on
Chile's partner countries in the trade agreements is relevant to the likely success of the strategy in the
long run. Moreover, even if the agreements are beneficial to Chile and its partners, if the benefits are
derived from losses to countries that are excluded from the agreements, then clearly the agreements
would be unattractive from the perspective of the multilateral trading system. Thus, it is important to
estimate the impact on partner and excluded countries from the Chilean strategy of additive regionalism
and assess the impact on the world in general.
Our estimates in Tables 6, 7 and 8 should help evaluate these issues.  In Table 6 welfare gains are
reported as a percent of own country GDP, both for our central and low elasticity cases. In order to be
-19-able to compare gains and losses across countries, in Table 7 (central elasticity) and Table 8 (low
elasticity) we present the estimated welfare gains in millions of 1995 US dollars. The first five columns
of row I of Table 6 reproduce the results for Chile's additive regionalism strategy that we presented in
the first five columns of table 5. Rows 2-1  1 present results for the other 10 countries or regions in our
model. Columns 6 and 7 present results for new scenarios we discuss in section 5.
A. Impact on Individual Countries and Regions
First, from the first five columns of Table 6 we see that Chile is too small,  or its trade pattern
sufficiently different, for its regional agreements to have more than a trivial impact on about half of the
countries and regions in the model (when we round welfare to the nearest one-hundredth of a percent of
GDP the impact is either zero or one-hundredth of a percent). This group includes Japan and the Rest of
the World (which are excluded from all the agreements evaluated in table 6) and the United States and the
European Union (which are excluded in some of the arrangements in table 6 and included in others).
Canada is also essentially unaffected by the trade policy options of Chile.
The Rest of South America and Central America, on the other hand, lose from all the agreements
from which they are excluded, although the welfare loss is only about 5 hundredths of a percent of their
GDP. These regions compete with Chile for the markets in MERCOSUR and NAFTA and compete with
producers from MERCOSUR and NAFTA for the Chilean market. In both cases they lose access to
markets since there is a decline in the demand for their exports due to preferential access arrangements
between Chile and its partners which adversely affects their terms of trade and welfare.32
Perhaps most interesting is that while the Rest of South America loses from being excluded by
Chile, the biggest loss for this region by far is when Rest of South America is included with Chile in a
free trade agreement (column 5).  The Rest of South America has high protection on the products
mentioned in footnote b to table 5. To the extent that Chilean imports displace imports from other
countries in the Rest of South America, the Rest of South America loses the tariff revenue on imports.
Although there is some trade creation from tariff free access to Chilean imports in the Rest of South
America, the tariff loss dominates the trade creation due to the high level of the tariffs. 33
For Mexico, competition from Chile for preferred access in the US market results in a very small
negative impact of including Chile in NAFTA. When Chile combines an agreement with NAFTA with an
agreement with MERCOSUR, the diversification of Chilean exports results in less displacement of
32This is consistent with the evidence of Winters and Wang [2001]. They found that the price of imports from the
United States and Korea in Brazil fell after the formation of MERCOSUR.
331f the high tariff products mentioned above are excluded from the free trade agreement with Chile, the losses are
reduced to about one-third of their level (to -0.36%).
-20-Mexican exports in the US, so the negative impact on Mexico of Chile in NAFTA is reduced. When
Chile adds the EU to its group of free trade agreements, the diversification of Chilean exports reduces the
small negative impact on Mexico of Chile's preferential access to the US to virtually zero.
Brazil and Argentina both gain small amounts from a MERCOSUR free trade agreement with
Chile. This is partly explained by improved access to the Chilean market for MERCOSUR  producers. It
is also likely that part of the explanation for this result is that Brazil and Argentina reduce trade diversion
costs of MERCOSUR when they add new partners. That is, Chile will compete with Brazilian producers
in Argentinian markets. This will reduce the trade diversion costs of Argentina from importing Brazilian
products under the MERCOSUR agreement. Of course, Chile could will displace imports from the Rest
of the World in Argentinian markets, which could increase Argentinian trade diversion costs. But as more
countries are added to a network of preferential trading arrangements the trade diversion costs associated
with earlier partners is reduced, especially if these are large countries that interject significant
competition.4 Comparing columns 4 and 5, we see that Brazil and Argentina both lose from Chile
negotiating a free trade agreement with the Rest of South America. This is likely due to a terms of trade
loss in the markets of the Rest of South America.
B. Aggregate Impact of Chile's Additive Regionalism Strategy
Even if Chile gains from an agreement or set of agreements, there is the question of whether
Chile gains only because other countries lose. In Tables 7 and 8 we convert the percentage gains and
losses of Table 6 into gains and losses in millions of 1995 US dollars. This allows us to compare gains
and losses across countries and arrive at a total for the world. In row 12 we sum the welfare effects for
countries that are included in the agreement. For example, Chile-MERCOSUR (column 1) includes Chile,
Argentina and Brazil in our model. Row 13 is sum of the welfare effect for all countries that are not part
of the agreement (e.g.g  all countries other than Chile, Argentina and Brazil in the case of Chile-
MERCOSUR). Row 14 is the sum over all countries.
From row 12, we see that  Chile-MERCOSUR is an agreement that is dominated by trade
diversion, to the extent that even the members of the agreement lose in aggregate. But this agreement is
the only one we consider that results in losses for the member countries. Other agreements that we
consider in Tables i and 8 are "North-South" agreements (in particular, all include the United States), and
we estimate that all of these result in aggregate net benefits for the member countries, even though at least
one member loses in all of them.  The inclusion of the United States means that significant competition is
341t  is possible,  however,  that a new  partner  could  divert  imports  from an excluded  country  and add to the trade
diversion  costs  on balance.
-21-injected into the markets of participating members and this reduces the likelihood of trade diversion
dominating.
From row 13 we see that all of the preferential arrangements we consider result in losses for the
excluded countries or regions. The largest losses for the excluded countries arises from the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas, where the EU loses due to a loss of terms of trade throughout the Americas.
These results are consistent with the results of Chang and Winters [1998]. Employing ex post data, they
have shown that there can be a very significant negative welfare effect (through negative terms of trade
effects) on countries excluded from regional arrangements. In particular, they estimate that MERCOSUR
induced losses for  the United States, Germany, Japan, Korea and Chile of about $800 million per year,
which was about nine percent of the value of their exports to MERCOSUR. 35
For the world as a whole, with central elasticities (Table 7) the agreement with MERCOSUR
results in losses for the world of $183 million, primarily due to the trade diversion costs for Chile and the
terms of trade loss for the EU. Independent of elasticities, the agreements in the first three columns result
in essentially a zero  impact for the world or for the three excluded regions outside of the Western
Hemisphere (rounded to the nearest hundredth of a percent of their own GDP). With NAFTA involved,
Chile has significant gains, but the terms of trade loss for the excluded countries is almost as much as the
gains to Chile, so the impact on the world in small.
In columns 4 and 5 we see that the gains for the world become significant when the EU is added
or when the EU and the Rest of South America are added to Chile's network of agreements. The main
reason there are much larger gains to the world is that the gains to Chile become very large when it
obtains preferential access to the markets of the EU and the Rest of South America. As explained, given
the high protection on selected products in the Rest of South America, the trade diversion costs in this
region significantly reduce the gains to the world from including this region in Chile's network of free
trade agreements.
5. The Impact of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
and Comparison to Global Free Trade
The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) is clearly worthy of an extensive treatment.
The estimates we provide in this section provide an initial assessment of likely impacts across the
countries and regions of our model. The FTAA also impacts Chile's additive regionalism strategy, so is
35We estimate a very small negative effect for Central America as a result of Chile forming a free trade area with
NAFTA.
-22-relevant in the context on our principal focus. As a point of comparison, we also estimate the impact of
global free trade on the countries and regions of our model. These results are presented in columns 6 and
7 of Tables 6, 7 and 8. The average external protection rates of all the countries and regions in our model
are presented in Table 9, where the protection rates include the estimated tariff equivalent of the non-
tariff barriers.
A. Impact of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
From row 12 of Tables 7 and 8, we see that the FTAA generates substantial welfare gains for the
countries of the Americas in aggregate: $25.2 billion per year, or $9.6 billion per year depending on
elasticities. This indicates that the FTAA is "trade creating" for the member countries in aggregate.  The
excluded countries, on the other hand, lose between $12.7 billion and $9.1 billion per year. In the central
elasticity case, the world as a whole gains $12.4 billion fron the FTAA, but only very little in the low
elasticity case. With central elasticities, there is so much competition within the Americas that the gains
to the members countries of additional trade creation vastly exceed the costs to the excluded countries.
Reduced competition in the low elasticity case greatly reduces the estimated gains within the Americas so
that the net impact on the world is reduced to $0.5 billion.
Almost all of the individual countries and regions in the Americas are estimated to gain.  Central
America is notable by the standards of these types of models, for the enormous estimated gains, equal to
16% or 7% of its GDP, depending on elasticities. The gains are roughly equally attributable to
preferential access to markets in the Americas and to increased competition in its own markets. That is,
similar to other countries in the Hemisphere, Central America obtains an improvement of its terms of
trade throughout the Americas relative to countries outside the Americas. In addition, in the cases of
NAFTA and MERCOSUR  it obtains improved access relative to countries within these agreements.
Moreover, given the size of the aggregate economy of the Americas, competition from this large region in
the markets of Central America results in gains from trade creation in its own markets which were
protected at levels that were quite costly to itself in products like grains, textiles, meat and beverages and
tobacco (see Table 9). Through comparison with the results of Global Free Trade for Central America,
we see that both preferential access and increased competition in its own markets are important parts of
the explanation of the results for Central America. The region gains about twice as much from the FTAA
as it does from Global Free Trade, so preferential access is important. But Global Free Trade is also quite
valuable to Central America, where the gains come primarily from improved resource allocation in its
own market due to increased competition from global competitors.
The only exception to this pattern of gains within the Americas from the FTAA is Mexico (and
-23-Canada in the low elasticity case).  Mexico sees an erosion of its preferential access to the US market and
thus loses $1.4 billion in the central elasticity case.
All excluded regions in the model lose from the FTAA due to terms of trade losses. The big loser
from the FTAA in dollar terms is the EU, which loses $7.3 billion or $4.8 billion depending on
elasticities. The estimated losses of the EU from the FTAA are almost exactly offset by the estimated
gains to the United States. The European Union, however, has negotiated free trade arrangements with
several countries or regions in the Americas, which would likely reduce these losses.
B. Impact of Global Free Trade
The results for global free trade are presented in the column 7 of Tables 6, 7 and 8. As expected
the gains to the world vastly exceed the gains from any regional arrangement.  In the central elasticity
case, multilateral global free trade results in estimated gains to the world that are 36 times greater than the
value of the gains from  the FTAA, and in the low elasticity case the ratio is over 400 to 1. Even the
Americas gain more from multilateral global free trade than from the FTAA. The aggregate gain to the
Americas from global free trade is $35.6 billion with central elasticities, or $12.8 billion with low
elasticities, so the Americas in aggregate gain 33% to 41% more from Global Free Trade. These results
emphasize the importance of moving toward lower trade barriers in the multilateral context.
Mexico (and Canada in the low elasticity case), however,  is an exception. Mexico sees losses
from global free trade due to the erosion of favored access to the US market.
6. Conclusions
Our results for Chile point to some more general themes regarding regional trading arrangements.
One clear theme is that improved market access in preferential trading areas is important. In the case of
Chile, trade diversion costs dominate the welfare effects of bilateral agreements unless sufficient market
access is obtained in partner countries (or third country tariffs are lowered). The North-South agreements
generally provide sufficient access to make them beneficial, but the South-South agreement we examined
did not (although Chile could lower its external tariff to make the South-South arrangement beneficial).
We show that efficient replacement taxes are important with either regional or unilateral trade policy
changes, and provide greater scope for trade policy action. Finally, our range of estimates for the gains
from additive regionalism indicate that Chile has little to lose by pursuing this strategy, and may
potentially gain many multiples of the gains from unilateral trade liberalization.
We find that the excluded countries lose from all of the regional arrangements that we examine
and that the biggest losses for the excluded countries arise from the Free Trade Agreement of the
-24-Americas. The EU is estimated to be the big loser from the FTAA in an amount roughly equal to the
gains to the US. On the other hand, the FTAA generates some substantial gains to the members of the
Hemisphere, with the exception of Mexico and Canada.
Chile's additive regional arrangements have an almost imperceptible impact on world welfare,
while the FTAA is quite positive with our central elasticities. Nonetheless, we estimate that Global Free
Trade generates gains to the world that are between 30 and 400 times greater than the gains from the
FTAA. Even the Americas as a whole gain more from Global Free Trade than from the FTAA,
emphasizing the importance of moving toward lower trade barriers in the multilateral context.
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-28-Table  1:  Welfare  and  Government  Revenue  Results  for Chile's  Trade  Policy Options
With Replacement Taxes As:  Combined Effect of
Existing VAT  Uniform VAT a/  Lump Sum  Trade Policy  V  a
Policy Simulation  % change  % chan e  - %change  tariff revenue  % change  % change  tariff revenue
in welfare c/  in VATY  |  in welfare c/  % of GDP  I  in welfare c/  in welfare c/  % of GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
1. FTA with Mercosur  (central elasticities)  -0.62  45  -0.40  1.7  -0.43  -0.19  1.8
(low elasticities)  0.04  17  0.07  2.7  0.08  0.19  2.7
2.  Customns  Union with Mercosur (central elasticities)  -0.95  52  -0.74  1.3  -0.73  -0.62  1.2
(low elasticities)  -0.20  21  -0.22  2.5  -0.17  -0.14  2.5
3.  FTA with NAFTA  (central elasticities)  0.82  48  1.03  0.9  1.04  1.23  0.9
(low elasticities)  0.30  26  0.31  2.1  0.38  0.43  2.1
4.  Zero tariffs on NAFTA imports, no improved  access (central elasticities)  -I .11  62  -0.92  0.7  -0.83  -0.64  0.7
(low elasticities)  -0.47  30  -0.45  2.0  -0.41  -0.33  2.0
5.  FTA with Mercosur and 6% external  tariff (central elasticities)  0.12  49  0.44  1.7  0.35  0.61  1.7
(low elasticities)  0.06  38  0.11  1.7  0.13  0.21  1.7
6.  FTAwithNAFTAand6%extemaltariff(central  elasticities)  1.46  45  1.72  1.1  1.70  1.89  1.1
(low elasticities)  0.41  41  0.45  1.4  0.49  0.55  1.4
7.  Reduce extemal tariff to 8% (central elasticities)  0.02  16  0.12  2.9  0.10  0.41  2.9
(low elasticities)  -0.11  17  -0.08  2.7  -0.06  0.03  2.7
8.  Reduce external tariff to 6% (central elasticities)  0.01  28  0.16  2.3  0.11  0.43  2.3
(low  elasticities).  -0.18  30  -0.14  2.1  -0.14  -0.04  2.1
9.  Reduce extemal tariff to zero (central elasticities)  -0.26  76  0.02  0  0.09  0.21  0
(low elasticities)  -0.54  72  -0.45  0  -0.42  -0.37  0
a/  In  these  scenarios  we  first  create  an equilibrium  with  a unifonn  VAT,  no  other  domestic  taxes,  then  evaluate  the  "pure"  effects  of the  trade  policy.
b/  These  scenarios  combine  the  impacts  of  the  trade  policy  simulation  with  going  to a uniform  VAT  and  elimination  of  the  domestic  output  tax,  government  revenues  held  constant.
c/  Percentage  change  in Hicksian  equivalent  variation  as  a percentage  of  GDP.
Required  equiproportional  increase  in the  VAT  rate  across  all sectors  to keep  government  revenues  unchanged.
-29-Table 2: Commodities, Regions & Factors of Production  in the Chile  Model
Commodities
WHT  Wheat
GRO  Other  Grains
NGC  Non-grain  crops
WOL  Wool  and  Other  livestock
FRS  Forestry
FSH  Fishing
ENR  Energy  products
MIN  Mineral  products
MEA  Meat  products
MIL  Milk  products
FOO  Other  food  products
B_T  Beverages  and  tobacco
TEX  Textiles  and  apparel  and  leather  products
LUM  Lumber  and  wood
PPP  Pulp  and  paper
CRP  Chemicals  rubber  and  plastics
I S  Primary  ferrous  metals
NFM  Non-ferrous  metals
FMP  Fabricated  metal  products
TRN  Transport  industries
MAC  Machinery  and  equipment
T  T  Trade  and  transport
SER  Services





RSA  Rest  of  South  America
USA  United  States  of America
CAN  Canada
MEX  Mexico
CAM  Central  America  and  Caribbean
E  U  European  Union  15
JPN  Japan





-30-Table 3:  Value Added Shares, Trade Structure,  Tariffs '  and Indirect Taxes in Chile
VA%  Sectoral  value added as a percent of aggregate  value added
EXPORP/o  Sector exports as a percent of aggregate exports
IMPORv/o  Sector  imports as a percent of aggregate  imports
EXPORT INTENSITY  Sector  exports as a percentage of domestic output
IMPORT INTENSITY  Sector  imports as a percentage of domestic demand
VAT  Estimated collected  value added tax rate in Chile
TY  Estimated output  tax by sector in Chile
EXPORT  IMPORT
Sector  VA%  EXPORT%  IMPORT%  INTENSITY  INTENSlTY  VAT  TY
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
WHT  I  1  17  17.2  2.7
GRO  1  16  30  17.2  2.7
NGC  6  11  1  44  9  16.8  2.8
WOL  2  2  2  3.8  0.6
FRS  I  1  32  1.8  1.3
FSH  2  4  43  1  6.9  0.8
ENR  2  10  1  29  14.2  12.1
MIN  5  12  2  41  9  0.3
MEA  1  2  7  18  -0.1
MIL  I  1  12  18  0.3
FOO  2  9  2  24  8  18  0.1
B  T  I  I  1  16  9  18  27.6
TEX  1  2  7  9  33  18  0.5
LUM  2  4  40  7  18  0.9
PPP  2  6  2  42  21  18  0.7
CRP  2  3  11  14  39  14.2  0.5
I  S  1  3  91  98  6.1  0.8
NFM  4  25  1  74  7  17.6  0.9
FMP  1  2  5  20  11.5  0.2
TRN  I  16  99  100  9.8  -1.3
MAC  2  27  39  91  10.3  0.7
T_T  21  10  6  9  7  2.8  2.2
SER  44  7  8  4  5  3  2.2
Source:  GTAP  Database,  version  3 (preliminary),  authors'  calculations,  and Harrison,  Rutherford  and Tarr [1997b,  appendix  A] for VAT  and  TY rates.
-31-Table 4: Effects of Policies on Chilean Production  and Trade (Central Elasticities  & Existing  VAT Replacement)
OUTPUT:  Percent  change  in  domestically  produced  output  in  Chile
EXPORT:  Percent  change  in Chilean  exports
IMPORT:  Percent  change  in Chilean  imports
IMP ARG:  Percent  change  in Argentinian  imports
IMP-BRA:  Percent  change  in Brazilian  imports
IMP-USA:  Percent  change  in US imports
Free  Trade  Area  with  Mercosur--central  elasticities  and  existing  VAT  replacement
OUTPUT  EXPORT  IMPORT  IMP  ARG  IMP  BRA  IMP-USA
WHT  -5  -1  -14  10
GRO  -27  -18  36  10  -3  -2
NGC  -4  46  68 
WOL  -6  14  92  -6  3
FRS  -5  1  244
FSH  -6  -1  37  -
ENR  -7  2  (-20  1
MIN  3  13  59  1  13
MEA  -6  12  58  4  -6
MIL  50  -3  2  -1
FOO  -11  -1  18  3  -1
BT  1  18  9  9  50
TEX  -11  20  17  -7 
LUN  -7  -6  53  11  3
PPP  -15  -6  378  7
CRP  -22  -9  ~  3-15  -1
I  S  101  60  18  3  -6
NThM  1  3  18  22  50  -1
FM4P  -1  24  60-7  3
TRN  2523  2525  3811  3
MAC  105  164  -4  -1
T  T  -1  4  23  1
SER  -1  10  45  13  9
Free Trade Area with NAFTA--central elasticities and existing VAT replacement
OUTPUT  EXPORT  IMPORT  IMP_ARG  IMP-BRA  IMP-USA
WHT  -59  -J4  5  -1
GR0  -78  - 1 7  -6  1  -9
NGC  46  98  73  -1  -1  2
WOL  -17  -28  349  -1  -1
FRS  -8  -1  -1
FSH  1I
ENR  -4  3  9  -1
MNI  5  11  75  1
MEA  -10  -23  61  -1  -2  -1
MIL  81  2  -1
FOO  -11  -5 
B  T  -1  27  5  1
TEX  15  155  13
LUM4  -9  -6  96
PPP  -29  -26  53  -1
CRP  -25  -8  32
1  s  771  458  5  1
NF1M  9  13  26  -1  -4  4
FMP  -11  -582
TRN  123  123  3
MAC  -13  4  3
T  T  -2  4  103  -1
SER  -1  16  111  -1  -1
Reduce External Tariffs to 8 Percent--Central  elasticities and Existing VAT replacement
OUTPUT  EXPORT  IMPORT  IMP_ARG  IMP_BRA
WHT  -9  -4  19  -1
GRO  -8  -3
NGC  I  59  20
WOL  -2  4  13
FRS  1  7
FSH  2  4  15
ENR  -3  5 
MIN  4  7  22  1
MEA  -2  3  14
NIL  I
FOO  -1  3  16
B T  6  10
TEX  -8  -3  10
LUM  -1  I  22
PPP  -3  1  9
CRP  -8  -2  7
I  S  54  32  1
Nr4  8  11  5  1  2
FMP  -1  5  17
TRN  60  59  1
MAC  5  1
TT  6  16
SER  5  18
Source: Model estimates.
-32-Table 5.  Welfare Results of Additive Free Trade Agreements  by Chile (Chilean gains as a percent of Chilean GDP with
central elasticities & Lump Sum tax replacement)
AGREEMENTS WITH:
MERCOSUR  NAFTA  NAFTA  &  NAFTA  &  NAFTA  &  CANADA  &
MERCOSUR  MERCOSURh  MERCOSUR  &  MEXICO
EU  EU &  MERCOSUR  &
Rest  of SA'4'  EU&
Rest  of SAN'
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Product Covera2e
1. All products included  -0.43  1.04  1.48  5.24  8.4  8.16
2. Excluded products:!'  -0.43  1.04  1.48  2.02  2.48  0.44
3. Excluded products-i  0.35  1.70  2.01  2.29  2.66  0.87
and 6% external tariff
4. Only EU AG. products  -0.43  1.04  1.48  2.02  5.48  3.90
excluded
5.  Only EU AG. products  0.35  1.70  2.01  2.29  5.71  4.44
excluded  and 6%
tariff
e'  Rest of SA is South America except for Chile and the MERCOSUR  countries.
A'  Excluded products in the agreement  with the EU and their tariffs plus non-tariff equivalents  in the EU are: wheat
(57%), grains (74%), non-grain crops (51%), fishing (14%), meat (63%), and milk (129%). Excluded products in the
agreement with the Rest of South America (and their tariffs) are: non-grain crops (29%),  meat (51%), milk (27%), food
(34%), beverages and tobacco (55%), textiles and apparel (46%), chemicals,  rubber and plastics (31%), fabricated metal
products (43%), and machinery (52%).
'  Only the agricultural  products from the EU listed in footnote b are excluded from any of the FTAs.
Source:  Model estimates by authors.
-33-Table 6.  The Welfare Impact of Chile's Additive Free Trade Agreements,  the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas and Global
Free Trade  L/
(Welfare gains as a percent of each country's GDP)
AGREEMENTS WITH:
MERCOSUR  NAETA  NAFTA &  NAFTA &  NAFTA &  FREE TRADE  GLOBAL
MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR&  MERCOSUR  AGREEMENT  FREE
EU  & EU & Rest  OF THE  TRADE
of SAtl  AMERICAS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Country  Elasticity
1. Chile  (central)  -0.40  1.04  1.48  5.24  8.40  1.25  1.26
(low)  0.00  0.37  0.60  2.55  3.31  0.53  0.68
2. United States  (central)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.34
(low)  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.18
3. Canada  (central)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.08  0.42
(low)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.05  -0.36
4. Mexico  (central)  0.00  -0.02  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.43  -1.38
(low)  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.21  -1.02
5. Argentina  (central)  0.06  0.00  0.10  0.12  0.07  0.31  0.82
(low)  0.00  -0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.09  0.60
6. Brazil  (central)  0.02  -0.01  -0.04  -0.04  -0.02  0.57  0.94
(low)  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.16  0.24
7. Central America  (central)  0.00  -0.06  -0.05  -0.04  -0.06  16.16  9.70
(low)  0.00  -0.03  -0.03  -0.05  -0.06  6.68  4.42
8. Rest of So. America  (central)  0.00  -0.03  -0.06  -0.04  -1.19  3.48  4.40
(low)  0.00  -0.02  -0.04  -0.05  -0.22  0.47  1.25
9. European Union  (central)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.10  2.74
(low)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.06  1.17
10. Japan  (central)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  3.43
(low)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.02  1.98
11. Rest of the World  (central)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.11  1.97
(low)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.08  0.54
e'  All products  included  in agreements  and lumpsum  tax replacement.
&'  Rest of SA is South America  except for Chile, Argentina  and Brazil.
Source:  Model  estimates  by authors.
-34-Table 7.  The Welfare  Impact of Chile's  Additive  Free Trade  Agreements,  the Free Trade  Agreement  of the Americas  and Global
Free Trade!'
(Welfare  gains in millions  of 1995 US dollars,  central elasticity case)
AGREEMENTS WITH:
MERCOSUR  NAFTA  NAFTA  &  NAFTA  &  NAFTA  &  FREE  TRADE  GLOBAL
MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR&  MERCOSUR  &  AGREEMENT  FREE
EU  EU & Rest  of  OF THE  TRADE
SA'  AMERICAS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Countrv
1.  Chile  -291  414  590  2090  3350  499  504
2. United  States  -7  51  -29  138  60  6506  19972
3.  Canada  5  -20  -22  23  49  456  243
4.  Mexico  13  -58  -44  -11  15  -1428  -4539
5. Argentina  63  -1  222  264  147  687  1832
6.  Brazil  214  -42  -171  -161  -70  2381  3912
7. Central  America  4  -37  -32  -23  -38  10179  6112
8.  Rest of So.  America  -34  -56  -95  -73  -2024  5888  7456
9. European  Union  -184  -156  -336  -88  -200  -7316  207413
10.  Japan  -58  -19  -30  81  -2  -536  127664
11.  Rest  of the World  92  -73  -50  -115  6  -4867  85111
12.  SumforIncludedCountries'  -14  387  546  2255  1327  25168
13.  Sum  for Excluded  Countries  'k  -169  -384  -543  -130  -34  -12719
14.  Sum  over  all counttries  -183  3  3  2125  1293  12449  455680
'  All products included in agreements  and lumpsum tax replacement.
b  Rest of SA is South America except for Chile, Argentina and Brazil.
L Sum of the welfare impact for countries included in the agreement.
a'  Sum  of the welfare  impact for countries excluded from the agreement.
Source: Model estimates by authors.
-35-Table 8. The Welfare Impact of Chile's Additive  Free Trade Agreements,  the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas  and
Global Free Trade  '
(Welfare gains in milions of 1995 US dollars, low elasticity  case)
AGREEMENTS  WITH:
MERCOSUR  NAFTA  NAFTA  &  NAFTA  &  NAFTA  &  FREE  TRADE  GLOBAL
MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR&  MERCOSUR  &  AGREEMENT  OF  FREE
EU  EU  & Rest  of  THE  AMERICAS  TRADE
SAY
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Country
1.  Chile  -67  149  239  1013  1318  209  270
2. United  States  -24  306  231  59  -11  4708  10833
3. Canada  4  -15  -13  14  19  -278  -2058
4. Mexico  I  -35  -35  -3  0  -685  -3315
5. Argentina  44  -18  54  54  28  188  1327
6. Brazil  108  -36  15  -11  -21  648  1004
7.  Central  America  3  -21  -21  -29  -36  4047  2680
8.  Rest  of So.  America  -28  -39  -75  -90  -376  788  2110
9. European  Union  -28  -241  -317  156  86  -4774  88720
10.  Japan  -30  -48  -69  -76  -91  -804  73711
11.  Rest  of the  World  29  -89  -100  -229  -232  -3560  23348
12.  Sum  for Included  Countries-P'  85  405  491  1282  1043  9625
13.  Sum  for Excluded  Countriesvd  -73  -492  -582  -424  -359  -9138
14.  Sum  overall counttries  12  -87  -91  858  684  487  198626
v  All products included in agreements and lumpsum tax replacement.
t  Rest of SA is South America except for Chile, Argentina and Brazil.
d  Sum of the welfare impact for countries included in the agreement.
L  Sum  of the welfare  impact for countries excluded from the agreement.
Source:  Model estimates by authors.
-36-Table 9: Ad Valorem Protection Estimates for All the Countries (Regions) and Products in our model-e
SECTOR  CHILE  ARGENTINA  BRAZIL  REsT OF  USA  CANADA  MWXICO  CENTRAL  EU  JAPAN  REST  OF
SOUTH  AMERiCA  THE
AMERICA  WORD
WHT  11  5  2  6  5  78  308  41
GRO  11  4  3  13  1  21  92  336  96
NGC  11  5  5  25  15  1  1  7  52  42  32
WOL  11  4  5  13  1  11  2  35
FRS  11  2  2  15  2  8
FSH  11  6  5  17  1  1  11  6  5  17
ENR  11  22  1  7
MIN  11  4  6  27  3  2  4  11  11
MEA  11  4  8  31  10  8  2  20  61  308  50
MIL  11  14  15  31  87  115  6  8  149  207  38
FOO  11  9  9  22  4  3  2  10  12  14  17
B  T  11  17  16  48  4  3  14  26  21  11  48
TEX  11  16  12  43  15  14  5  27  10  11  28
LUM  11  9  11  37  1  2  2  15  2  3  14
PPP  11  8  8  11  2  1  9  1  12
CRP  11  9  9  26  9  2  3  9  10  4  14
I_S  11  5  12  25  9  5  3  8  4  4  13
NFM  11  6  7  22  3  1  2  8  1  1  11
FMP  11  11  15  41  5  3  3  13  3  3  20
TRN  11  10  15  27  2  2  2  19  4  2  20
MAC  11  14  15  30  15  2  3  10  7  1  14
T_T  11
SER  11
E Tariff estimates include the estimated tariff equivalents  of non-tariff barriers.
-37-Figure 1: Production and Allocation  of Output
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-38-Figure 2:  Consumer Demand




Good I  Go;  d i  Good  24
CES  CES  CES
x_  /  ><  GDM=i
5 aCs  C  DM-1
5 ><  DMIS1
Consumption  ....  Composite  Import  Consumption  ....  Composite  Import  Consumption  ....  Composite  Import
Good I  Good  (1)  Good  i  Good  i  Good  24  Good 24
>CES  c  =30  CES  ca-=30  CES  a
Imports  of  Imports  of  Imports  of  Imports  of  Imports  of  Imports  of
Good  I from  Good  I from  Good i from  Good  i from  Good  24  from  Good  24  from
Country  I  Country  10  Country  I  Country  10  Country  I  Country  10
-39-Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2615  Trade,  Growth,  and Poverty  David  Dollar  June  2001  E. Khine
Aart Kraay  37471
WPS2616  Reforming  Land  and  Real  Estate  Ahmed  Galal  June  :2001  D. Dietrich
Markets  Omar Razzaz  34995
WPS2617  Shanghai  Rising  in a Globalizing  Shahid  Yusuf  June  2001  S. Yusuf
World  Weiping  Wu  82339
WPS2618  Globalization  and  the Challenge  Shahid  Yusuf  June  2001  S. Yusuf
for Developing  Countries  82339
WPS2619 Do Banks  Provision  for Bad Loans  Michele  Cavallo  June  2001  E. Mekhova
in Good  Times?  Empirical  Evidence  Giovanni  Majnoni  85986
and Policy  Implications
WPS2620  Who  Owns  the Media?  Simeon  Djankov  June  2001  R. Sugui
Caralee  McLiesh  37951
Tatiana  Nenova
Andrei  Shleifer
WPS2621 Does  Indonesia  Have  a "Low-Pay"  Deon  Filmer  June  2001  H. Sladovich
Civil Service?  David  L. Lindauer  37698
WPS2622  Community  Programs  and  Women's  David  Coady  June  2001  L. Wang
Participation:  The  Chinese  Experience  Xinyi  Dai  37596
Limin  Wang
WPS  2623  Trade  Liberalization  in China's  Elena  lanchovichina  June  2001  L. Tabada
Accession  to the World  Trade  Will Martin  36896
Organization
WPS2624  Are Incentives  Everything?  Payment Varun  Gauri  June  2001  H. Sladovich
Mechanisms  for Health  Care  Providers  37698
in Developing  Countries
WPS2625  Australia's  Experience  with Local  Garry Pursell  June  2001  L.  Tabada
Content  Programs  in the Auto Industry:  36896
Lessons  for India  and  Other Developing
Countries
WPS2626 Mandatory  Severance  Pay: Its  Donna  MacIsaac  June  2001  H. Sladovich
Coverage  and Effects  in Peru  Martin  Rama  37698
WPS2627  With the Help  of  One's Neighbors:  Harold  Alderman  June  2001  P. Sader
Externalities  in the Production  Jesko Hentschel  33902
of Nutrition  in Peru  Ricardo  SabatesPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2628 Monopoly  Power  and Distribution  in  Hanan  G. Jacoby  June 2001  P. Kokila
Fragmented  Markets:  The  Case  of  Rinku  Murgai  33716
Groundwater  Saeed  Ur  Rehman
WPS2629 Bridging  the Digital  Divide:  How  George  R. G. Clarke  July 2001  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Enterprise  Ownership  and Foreign  37644
Competition  Affect Internet  Access
in Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Asia
WPS2630 Parallel  Imports  of Pharmaceutical  Mattias  Ganslandt  July 2001  L. Tabada
Products  in the European  Union  36896
WPS2631 Pension  Reform  in Hungary:  Roberta  Rocha  July 2001  L. Gross
A Preliminary  Assessment  Dimitri  Vittas  37030
WPS2632 Human  Capital  and  Growth:  The  Sebastien  Dessus  July 2001  K. Mazo
Recovered  Role  of Education  Systems  39744
WPS2633 Bank  Privatization  in Argentina:  George  R. G. Clarke  July 2001  P. Sintim-Aboagye
A Model  of Political  Constraints  and  Robert  Cull  37644
Differential  Outcomes